Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 48
Issue 4 October 2015

Article 1

2015

Challenges for "Affected States" in Accepting International
Disaster Aid: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina
E. Katchka

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Disaster Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
E. Katchka, Challenges for "Affected States" in Accepting International Disaster Aid: Lessons from
Hurricane Katrina, 48 Vanderbilt Law Review 921 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol48/iss4/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Challenges for "Affected States" in
Accepting International Disaster
from Hurricane
Aid: Lessons
Katrina
E. Katchka*
ABSTRACT

The InternationalLaw Commission (ILC) draft articles on
the protection of persons in the event of disasters purport to
"facilitatean adequate and effective response to disasters that
meets the essential needs of the persons concerned, with respect
to their full rights" by setting forth complementary principles
governing both individual state responsibilities and
international cooperation in disaster response. The principles
presented in

the

draft articles reflect an

application of

established international law principles as well as current,
practical challenges to coordinating international disaster
cooperation. This article applies specific ILC draft articles
targeting the role of the state impacted by a disaster to the
United States' experience in managing internationalassistance
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. In particular, it

highlights the critical responsibility of the nationalgovernment
to take advance, deliberate steps to implement the principles set
out in the ILC draft articles-ensuring sufficient legal
authorities and protocols and plans for implementing them in a
disaster context-if it hopes to effectively maximize the
supplemental resources available from the international
community to support its domestic response to a catastrophic
disaster.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The International Law Commission (ILC) draft articles on the
Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters (ILC draft articles)
purport to "facilitate an adequate and effective response to disasters
that meets the essential needs of the persons concerned, with full
respect for their rights"' by setting forth complementary principles
governing both individual state responsibilities and international
cooperation in disaster response. The ILC draft articles reflect an
application of established international law principles, such as those
pertaining to sovereignty and humanitarian rights,2 as well as
recognition of current, practical challenges to the effective
coordination of international disaster cooperation. For example, with
respect to states 3 impacted by a disaster, the draft articles first set
out the fundamental role and responsibilities of the sovereign state
that are impacted by a disaster in Articles 11 and 12, and then show
the inherent practical challenges faced by that state in draft Articles
14, 15, and 17. Specifically, the latter articles set out roles for that
state in providing its consent to, conditions on, and facilitation of
external assistance it will accept to support its response to those
impacted by a disaster.
The draft articles are valid as far as they go, but they serve as
flags, rather than solutions, to the practical challenges states must
take up. Such an international legal instrument is arguably not the
place to prescribe particulars of how states should give practical effect
to the principles and goals set out by the articles. Indeed, this is not
feasible given the diverse circumstances among states in terms of

Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of its Sixty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc.
1.
http://legal.un.org/ildreports/2014/2014report.htm
(2014),
86
at
A/69/10,
[http://perma.cc/ZJC7-EPRH](archived Sept. 10, 2015).
2.
See id. at 99-103 (addressing human dignity, human rights, humanitarian
principles, and themes of individual rights and sovereignty generally).
3.
Unless otherwise noted, the term "state" in this Article refers to the
country or nation-state.
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their individual existing emergency management legal framework,
operational capabilities, degree of centralization in disaster
responsibility, and extent of ancillary considerations, such as cultural
or humanitarian practices. The commentary to the draft articles
acknowledges in multiple contexts the intentional flexibility reflected
in the drafting of these provisions.4 It is incumbent on each state to
determine what actions to take to meaningfully implement the intent
of the draft articles based on that state's distinctive national
situation-not just arising from an ongoing disaster, but in light of its
existing legal and operational framework.
This Article will focus on the challenge of giving meaningful
effect to certain ILC draft articles-particularly, the practical
relevance of those draft articles that address the role of the state
impacted by a disaster in contemplating international assistance in
support of its national disaster response. The Article will examine
these issues in the context of the U.S. government's experience as the
"affected state"-largely drawing on its experience dealing with offers
of "external assistance" in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina-and
subsequent U.S. efforts to strategically shape a mechanism that, in
effect, balances the principles set out in ILC draft Articles 14, 15, and
17.5 The goals of these articles posed the greatest practical
implementation challenges to the U.S. government.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES AS AN "AFFECTED STATE"

In terms of responding to disasters affecting its own territory
and people, the United States comes from its own set of
circumstances, distinct from those of many other states considering
how to apply the ILC articles to their own circumstances. The U.S.
experience and domestic legal framework posed both advantages and
disadvantages when the United States first considered receiving
international assistance in support of its disaster response
operations.
First, the United States is fortunate to have a relatively
comprehensive and well-established domestic legal and institutional
emergency management framework based in the U.S. government's
system of federalism. While the U.S. Constitution reserves to the U.S.
states the authority and responsibility to protect the public health

4.
See, e.g., Int'l Law Comm'n, supra note 1, at 128 ("[T]he procedure to
identify needs is not predetermined, and it is left to the affected State to follow the
most suitable one.").
5.
See id. at 95 (defining "affected state" as the state with jurisdiction over
the persons and property impacted by a disaster and "external assistance" as "relief
personnel, equipment and goods, and services" provided by assisting states to the
affected state).
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and safety of individuals within their territories, 6 the U.S.
government recognized it had a role in supplementing state and local
disaster relief efforts throughout the nineteenth and first half of the
twentieth centuries. 7 The first general, standing authority for the
federal government to respond to disasters was authorized in 1950.8
In the 1970s, the United States secured both the legal and
institutional precursors to today's U.S. emergency management
emergency
structure: Congress enacted comprehensive U.S.
management law, which is the basis of the current authority for
federal emergency management, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act). 9 In 1979, the
President integrated multiple emergency management-related
agencies and offices into a new independent agency dedicated to the
federal coordination of emergency management, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 10 These actions established
a framework for the federal government to assist and supplement the
United States' response capabilities and to generally coordinate
federal, state, tribal, and local government roles across the range of
emergency management areas: preparedness, hazard mitigation,
response, and recovery. Since then, the U.S. government has also
developed operational frameworks to clarify and guide response roles
and coordination among federal agencies." In addition, U.S.

6.
See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution . . . are reserved to the States respectively . . . ."); see also Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25-27 (1905) (concluding that states may establish
safeguards to secure public health and safety).
7.
See Keith Bea, Congressional Research Service Report, Transfer of FEMA
to the Department of Homeland Security: Issues for CongressionalOversight at 13 (Dec.
17 2002) (offering examples of how federal disaster relief was provided through ad hoc
disaster relief legislation to address specific incidents).
8.
See Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-875, 64 Stat. 1109-10
(enacting a federal assistance response to disasters); see also Civil Defense Act of 1950,
Pub. L. No. 81-920, 64 Stat. 1245-51 (1951) (enacting a national plan for civil defense
measures against attacks on life and property).
9.
See Disaster Relief Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-606, 84 Stat. 1744-60
(establishing comprehensive federal disaster relief program); see also id. at 143-64
(revising and expanding federal relief programs for major disasters); Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance (Stafford) Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707, 102
Stat. 4689-4716 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207) (amending
Disaster Relief Act of 1974).
10.
See Exec. Order No. 12,127, 44 Fed. Reg. 19,367 (Mar. 31, 1979),
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codificationlexecutive-order/12 148.html
[http://perma.cc/3RM4-BP4W] (activating FEMA); Exec. Order No. 12,148, 44 Fed. Reg.
43,239 (July 20, 1979), http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/ executiverelief
(consolidating
disaster
[http://perma.cc/M6Y5-QW96]
order/12148.html
authorities within FEMA); see also Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107296, 116 Stat. 2135-2321 (incorporating FEMA into the newly created Department of
Homeland Security).
11.

See, e.g., DEP'T. OF HOMELAND SEcURITY, NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK

3 (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter NRF], http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-
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government agencies, as well as state and local governments, are-for
better or worse-well practiced in implementing these legal and
operational authorities in disaster response: in the last fifty years,
the U.S. government has provided federal assistance for over 2100
declared major disasters and emergencies, and state and local
governments have responded to many more incidents that did not
warrant supplemental federal assistance. 12
The United States also has an elaborate legal framework for
regulating the entry and use of goods and people to the United States.
About thirty laws regulating medicine, food, agricultural products,
and related items are administered by fifteen agencies-with lead
oversight by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS), and
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). 13 The U.S.
Department of Commerce (DOC), the U.S. Department of
Transportation, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), and the Environmental Protection Agency have regulatory
oversight responsibility for other materials, vehicles, and equipment.
Within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Customs
and Border Control (CBP) is a lead agency for border management
and control, including administration of general customs and entry
requirements for both goods and personnel.
In spite of its robust history of disaster response engagement and
purposeful establishment of legal and operational frameworks to
respond to disasters, the United States is relatively inexperienced in
accepting and integrating international assistance into its domestic
response procedures. It was not until September 2005, when
Hurricane Katrina slammed the Gulf Coast and caused massive
destruction across five states due to wind, storm surge, dozens of
tornadoes, and levee breaches, that the United States was faced with
entertaining offers of international disaster assistance. Hurricane

1914-25045-1246/final_national_response..framework_201305Ol.pdf [http://perma.cc/U
K8Q -CNKQ] (archived Oct. 16, 2015) (setting forth respective federal agency response
roles and responsibilities); see also Fed'l Emergency Mg't Agency, National Response
Plan (NRP) (2003) (the predecessor to the NRF governing federal operations at the
time of Hurricane Katrina). See generally FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/nationalresponse-framework. [http://perma.cc/7ACW-QVE7] (archived Sept. 11, 2015) (showing
how other national planning frameworks exist to inform federal coordination in
particular areas of emergency management).
12.
See FEMA, DISASTER DECLARATIONS BY YEAR (Feb. 25, 2015),
https://www.fema.gov/disasters/gridlyear. [http://perma.cc/X7R7-9BZN] (archived Sept.
11, 2015) (depicting how many major disaster declarations were made between 1953
and 2015).
13.

See U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-290, HIGH RISK SERIES: AN

UPDATE,
262,
268
(Feb.
2015),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668415.pdf
[http://perma.cclKK6G-5JQL] (archived Sept. 11, 2015) (highlighting the oversight and
actions of certain administrative agencies).
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Katrina displaced over one million people from their homes and
ultimately caused over $150 billion in damage, prompting more than
$120 billion in federal aid. 14 All told, 151 countries and international
organizations offered cash and in-kind assistance, including
equipment, food, and other supplies, as well as response personnel
and other technical experts.15 FE1IA and the U.S. government at
large had no guidance or systems in place to ensure orderly
consideration, acceptance, and utilization of such offers for the benefit
of persons impacted by the disaster. FEMA, in coordination with the
U.S. Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for
International Development/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
(USAID/OFDA), quickly established ad hoc processes for managing
international assistance offers to support the domestic response to
Hurricane Katrina. 16 This approach temporarily filled the vacuum in
preestablished procedures. It also largely served to highlight that
even though the ad hoc approach ostensibly reflected principles now
set out for affected states in ILC draft Articles 14, 15 and 17, it was
not a sustainable or ideal model for the United States, as an affected
state, to manage offers of international assistance effectively.
Consequently, in the wake of the Hurricane Katrina response,
DHS/FEMA, DOS, and USAID/OFDA led an interagency effort
composed of sixteen federal agencies to develop U.S. legal and
operational mechanisms into a practicable system for managing
international assistance that would balance operational, political, and
public policy interests.17 The resulting International Assistance
System Concept of Operations (IAS CONOPS) was intended to meet
the needs of those impacted by the disaster without undue

14.

See ALLISON PLYER, FACTS FOR FEATURES: KATRINA RECOVERY 1-4 (2014)

www.datacenterresearch.org [http://perma.ccl9CKB-X747] (detailing
impact of Hurricane Katrina).
15.

the

economic

THE WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA,

CHAPTER
FIVE:
LESSONS
LEARNED
n.90
(2006),
http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/chapter5.html
[http://perma.cc/ E3ZY-KXW5] (archived Sept. 11, 2015) ("One hundred fifty-one (151)
nations and international organizations offered financial or material assistance to
support relief efforts.").
16.
See U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-06-460, HURRICANE KATRINA:
COMPREHENSIVE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE APPROPRIATE
USE OF AND ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR INTERNATIONAL
ASSISTANCE 3 (2006),

(archived
[http://perma.cc/J9KT-AXMK]
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06460.pdf
Sept. 11, 2015) ('The U.S. government had never before received such large amounts of
international disaster assistance, and ad hoc procedures were developed to manage the
acceptance and distribution of the assistance.").
17.
See Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, U.S. Dep't. of State & U.S. Agency for
Int'l Dev., International Assistance System: Concept of Operations 13-20 (2010)
2010)],
https://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/748EN.pdf
[hereinafter
IAS
CONOPS
fhttps://perma.c/3Z3G-WZYL] (archived Sept. 11, 2015) (explaining the mechanisms
developed to manage international assistance).
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operational interference; ensure that the assistance provided was
safe, useful, and useable; and provide for timely communications on
external assistance needs and offers. 18 This included identifying
existing flexibility, discretion, and gaps in the U.S. regulatory and
emergency management legal framework and consciously considering
how to integrate and apply those authorities in the specific context of
coordinating international assistance in support of a federal response
to a catastrophic disaster in the United States.

III. IS THAT A 'YES"?: CONSENT OF THE AFFECTED STATE TO EXTERNAL
ASSISTANCE (ARTICLE 14)

In keeping with basic tenets of national sovereignty, the ILC
includes in Article 14 that external assistance requires the consent of
the affected state. 19 In addition to international law principles, there
are operational reasons why the affected state's consent to
international aid is crucial-and as a practical concern, knowing
what entity or officials from within the affected state has authority to
consent. While it was presumably no state's intent to infringe on U.S.
sovereignty when it made generous offers to aid the United States'
response efforts for Hurricane Katrina, there were in fact numerous
instances of assistance arriving in the United States where U.S.
officials were not clear about who, if anyone, had accepted the
assistance. 20 It is not clear whether Article 14 is intended to reflect a
general concurrence by an affected state that it will accept external
aid in principle for an event or from a particular assisting state
offering aid, or whether that consent should extend to each instance
of a particular offer. The United States did agree generally to accept
international aid for Hurricane Katrina. 21 But as a practical matter,
this general consent is not adequate and can serve to undermine the

18.

See id. at 7 (detailing the objectives of IAS CONOPS); see also FED.

EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE & U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV.,
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE SYSTEM CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (SBU/FOUO) (2009)
[hereinafter IAS CONOPS 2009]; FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL

ASSISTANCE SYSTEM: CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (2015) [hereinafter IAS CONOPS 2015],
(updating original IAS CONOPS), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1444
411200092-5b09869d53801ceb5640cOOb2f337e64/2015_IASCONOPSPublicVersion_
Accessible.pdf [http://perma.cc/43Q2-VBTX] (archived Oct. 16, 2015).
See Int'l Law Comm'n, supra note 1, at 88 ("The provision of external
19.
assistance requires the consent of the affected State.").
See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 16, at 4-5 (explaining
20.
that a lack of guidance and coordination resulted in certain supplies not being used).
21.
See Transcript of Daily Press Briefing at 1, U.S. Dept. of State (2005),
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/palprs/dpb/2005/52402.htm. [http://perma.cc/ VMX6-JMH4]
(archived Sept. 11, 2015) ("[Tjhe White House has made it clear that we will accept all
offers of foreign assistance.").
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effectiveness of the very operational response the external assistance

is intended to support if it is not also deliberately made and
communicated at a more specific level.
U.S. domestic law requires a federal agency to have express
authority to accept gifts or donations from non-federal entities. 22
During the Hurricane Katrina response, FEMA had clear authority to
accept gifts in furtherance of the disaster relief purposes of the

Stafford Act. 2 3 In addition, DOS and DOD had gift acceptance
authority consistent with their missions, but it was not clearly
established at the time whether it extended to supporting domestic
disaster response efforts. 24 Thus, the U.S. government initially
discussed incoming offers of assistance through an informal process
without a clear basis for accepting offers or clear entity that made the
call to consent to an offer, resulting in inconsistent communications of
offer acceptance to assisting states and the arrival of goods that were
unexpected or unnecessary. 25 Conversely, the United States lost
opportunities to get needed supplies when, for example, the
government of Switzerland withdrew its offer to send relief supplies
already loaded on the aircraft; by the time the United States
communicated its consent to a portion of the offer nine days after it
26
was made, there was no time to unload and repackage supplies.
This result may be attributed to the lack of initial procedures
detailing how the U.S. government would accept and communicate
any consent to the offer, once made, to the offering state. It also
highlights the practical importance of the provision of Article 14
requiring an affected state, when possible, to communicate its
27
decision regarding the offer to the one extending the offer.

See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-06-382SP, PRINCIPLES OF
22.
http://www.gao.gov/special.
6-223
(2006),
LAW
APPROPRIATIONS
FEDERAL
pubs/d06382sp.pdf [http://perma.cc/H39B-D5AA] (archived Sept. 11, 2015) (establishing
that agency acceptance of donations without statutory authority constitutes an
unlawful augmentation of federal appropriations).
23.
See 42 U.S.C. § 5201(b) (2012) ("In furtherance of the purposes of this Act,
the President or his delegate may accept and use bequests, gifts, or donations of
service, money, or property, real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible.").
24.
See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 16, at 7 (explaining that
DOS and DOD have gift authorities, though they may face certain restrictions).
25.
See id. at 5 (explaining that no system existed to track the assistance
provided).
26.

See THE WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA:

CHAPTER FOUR: A WEEK OF CRISIS n. 189 (2006), http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina.lessons-learned/chapter4.html (http://perma.cc/
KY3L-4GBQ] (archived Sept. 12, 2015) (explaining that, due to inadequate
management, the generous contributions could not be unloaded and repackaged
quickly enough).
See Int'l Law Comm'n, supra note 1, at 123 ("When an offer of assistance is
27.
extended .. . the State shall, whenever possible, make known its decision regarding the
offer.").
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With respect to the principle of "consent" in Article 14 then,
there appeared no intent to usurp the sovereignty of the United
States to address the needs of its citizens; the U.S. government had
existing legal authority under its national law to accept or "consent"
to the goods and services offered; and the U.S. government even had
contemplated in its National Response Plan the role of DOS in
communicating with other nations on matters related to disasters. 28
Yet, without proper advance planning of procedures to determine
when and how to consent to contributions from the international
community, FEMA risked, on the one hand, foregoing potentially
essential resources for addressing a catastrophic response and, on the
other, an influx of unexpected and unnecessary goods, complicating
logistics efforts and serving as an operational distraction and public
relations embarrassment.
Ultimately, in the course of coordinating international assistance
for Hurricane Katrina, the interagency team instituted internal
procedures for routing incoming offers of assistance from DOS
through USAID/OFDA to FEMA to accept. Internally, FEMA issued
delegations to clarify which individual officials were authorized to
make decisions to accept offers and communicated that to
USAID/OFDA and DOS officials. 29 After the response effort, the U.S.
government institutionalized in the IAS CONOPS clear roles and
responsibilities for communications regarding offers and acceptance
of international aid, including methods by which FEIA is informed of
all offers made, operational and policy considerations for accepting
offers, and ways in which the U.S. government communicates with
the international community about offers of or needs for external
assistance. 30 The U.S. government also pre-scripted external
messaging to ensure consistent, prompt communication from its
missions to other states upon any catastrophic event in the United
States--even before offers might be made. Such messaging serves, in
the first instance, both to inhibit an uncoordinated influx of offers as
well as to offer suggestions for directing immediate aid to nongovernmental organizations active in the disaster affected area, and
in other instances, this messaging serves to inform offering states of

28.

See

DEP'T

OF

STATE,

NATIONAL

RESPONSE

PLAN:

INTERNATIONAL

https://aglearn.usda.gov/
(2004),
INT-4
ANNEX
SUPPORT
COORDINATION
customcontent/NRP/assets/SupInternational.pdf [https://perma.cc/7B44.F9DU] (archived
Sept. 13, 2015) (explaining DOS's role as a coordinator for foreign assistance).
Memorandum from Acting Undersecretary Paulison on Delegation of Gift
29.
Acceptance Authority for Hurricane Katrina, to the Dir. of Response, Recovery, and
Preparedness, and associated redelegation to designated Response and Recovery
Division deputies, designated officials in the National Response Coordination Center
officials & Disaster Field Offices (Sept. 16, 2005).
See generally IAS CONOPS 2010, supra note 17; see also IAS CONOPS
30.
2015, supra note 18.
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logistics and conditions applicable to offers the United States may
accept. 3 1 These early communications are intended to quell the
confusion that offering countries experienced during Katrina in light
of delayed or conflicting communications from the U.S. government,
as well as to give the United States the opportunity to assess the
operational needs arising from the disaster.
Ideally, these practices prevent the affected state both from
arbitrarily consenting,
or withholding consent,
to external
assistance-either of which can jeopardize the effective response to
the disaster if inconsistent with the needs of persons impacted. Thus,
the affected state must consider in advance how, practically, to
implement Article 14's deference to the affected state's consent,
limited by its implication that such consent be deliberate and not
arbitrary.

IV. RECEIVING GOODS FOR HURRICANE KATRINA: THE BALANCING ACT
BETWEEN CONDITIONING AND FACILITATING EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE
(ARTICLES 15 AND 17)
The expediency with which disaster assistance is delivered is, of
course, critical to meeting the needs of those affected by the disaster.
At the same time, an inflow of unanticipated or unnecessary
resources can distract from and hinder effective response operations.
The tension in the responsibilities of the affected state to manage
external assistance smartly to avoid impeding operations while
ensuring timely access to that support is inherent in Articles 15 and
17. While the concern also applies to an affected state's acceptance of
personnel, the United States' experience in receiving goods in support
of Hurricane Katrina illustrates the importance of considered and
coordinated implementation of Articles 15 and 17.
The principle that the "needs of the persons affected by
disasters" informs to what extent the affected state will exercise its
discretion in consenting to external assistance under Article 14
carries over, and is supplemented by consideration for "the quality of
assistance," to guide an affected state in establishing "conditions on
the provision of external assistance," pursuant to Article 15.32 This
article also provides that such conditions shall be made within the
parameters of the ILC draft articles, international law, and "the
national law of the affected State." 33 Given FEMA's role as the lead

31.
See, e.g., IAS CONOPS 2015, supra note 18, at 10, 15, 25-26, 40-44
(highlighting the ways and means through which the U.S. government will accept aid
offers).
32.
Int'l Law Comm'n, supra note 1, at 127.
Id.
33.
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federal coordinating agency for disaster response operations, the
necessity of conditioning external assistance was likely the most
critical lesson it learned with respect to ensuring external assistance
would benefit, rather than hinder, effective delivery of disaster
response operations to persons affected by Hurricane Katrina.
The greatest logistical and economic cost of the influx of external
assistance FEMA received was due to assistance the U.S. government
accepted in general terms, without posing specific conditions. For
example, the United States received first aid kits with medication
and "meals ready to eat" (MRE) with food or alcohol that were
unacceptable for general public distribution in the United States
because they did not meet federal regulatory requirements. 34 The
highest profile example was the receipt of about 359,600 MREs that
included restricted food items, such as beef from a prohibited source
country due to U.S. bans in place at the time to prevent the import of
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as "Mad
Cow Disease." 35 As a result, the U.S. government spent about $80,000
to store the meals at a private warehouse in Little Rock, Arkansas for
up to six months after Hurricane Katrina struck, as it struggled with
the practical and political considerations for the disposition of the
meals. 36 This was on top of time and resource costs spent on the
logistics of initially transporting the majority of the meals to
distribution sites, only to recall them to the warehouse. 37 Had the
U.S. government ensured specificity in the "scope and type of
assistance" it accepted, as purported by Article 15, it could have
utilized significantly more of the incoming goods to benefit Hurricane
Katrina survivors.
In the examples of unusable or unnecessary first aid or food, the
problem of dealing with the goods often arose in the first place
because the United States failed to recognize and timely apply
existing regulatory prohibitions to their entry. The flip side of this is
that the goods arrived quickly and without initial impediment. This is
the essence of the dichotomy of Articles 15 and 17.
Put simply, Article 17 of the ILC draft articles recognizes the
critical factor of timing in disaster relief, requiring the affected state
to "take the necessary measures, within its national law, to facilitate
the prompt and effective provision of external assistance."38 This
includes facilitating the entry of both goods and personnel by
streamlining, waiving, and making more transparent national
regulations or requirements that may impede or serve to

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

U.S. Gov'T AcCOUNTABILITY OFF., supranote 16, at 22-23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Int'l Law Comm'n, supranote 1, at 131.
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disincentivize timely entry-for example, those governing customs,
taxation, and transport of goods, or visas, work permits, privileges
and immunities for personnel. In Hurricane Katrina, there were
numerous examples of the U.S. government exercising discretion to
decrease entry restrictions; in the case of the MREs, FEMA generally
accepted these pallets,
USAID/OFDA coordinated logistical
arrangements of them, and CBP facilitated their entry-but these
parties all did so without first coordinating with USDA and FDA on
regulatory restrictions.3 9 It was not clear which agency engaged in
accepting or receiving the goods was responsible for first clearing the
items or identifying appropriate conditions for them based on safety
regulations. Facilitating entry of external assistance without
conscious consideration of when and how to do so may prove
inefficient and costly both for the affected and assisting states.
U.S. domestic law and regulations, as well as FEMA operational
experience, had technically pre-identified what equipment, supplies,
and consumables were suitable to meet the general needs of U.S.
disaster survivors and responders. In addition to this complex safety
regulatory system, U.S. law and regulations had numerous provisions
providing measures of flexibility in the implementation or
enforcement of relevant entry requirements. DOC and CBP have
authority to allow importation of vehicles, equipment, and other
disaster relief supplies without entry and without payment of duty,
taxes or fees. 40 CBP also has discretion to waive visa requirements
and parole personnel for entry into the United States for emergency
and humanitarian reasons. 41 The lack of planning and application of
these administratively disbursed responsibilities, however, to support
a time-sensitive catastrophic disaster response in the United States
severely limited their usefulness in guiding U.S. government
decisions on accepting offers in the early aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina. As the U.S. government experienced during Hurricane
Katrina, the midst of a major disaster response effort is not the time
to call an interagency meeting with a dozen U.S. government offices
to identify the universe of discretionary waivers sprinkled among the
agencies, debate which public policy interests are more important,
and practically determine how to execute and communicate the
discretion. After all, while we want to facilitate entry of external
goods and services in the interest of meeting the health and safety
needs of disaster survivors, the same regulations that inhibit easy
entry, or bar certain foods and medications, exist in the interest of the
general health and safety of our citizens.

39.
40.
41.
(2012).

U.S. GoV'T AcCOUNTABLITY OFF., supra note 16, at 22.
19 U.S.C. § 1318 (2002); 19 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1984).
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212, 8 U.S.C.

§§

1182(d)(4)-(5)(A)
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After Hurricane Katrina, the interagency group incorporated
procedures for timely coordination of the operational and regulatory
agencies at the time of a disaster into the IAS CONOPS, 42 and in the
course of its five-year review of the IAS CONOPS, the group proposed
that FEMA convene an International Resources Coordination Group
when the IAS CONOPS is activated for a disaster and include
representatives from pertinent operational and regulatory agencies to
ensure that accepted resources are appropriately transported and
cleared into the United States.4 3 The IAS CONOPS incorporated
processes for streamlining or waiving entry requirements during
disaster response, including spelling out specific information and
timeframes to guide operational agencies in providing information
about proposed external assistance to pertinent regulatory agencies
to obtain timely clearances or instruction for foods and medications,
as well as for expedited entry of, for example, foreign response team
members.44 It also developed internal and evolving reference tools to
pre-identify the types and specifications of equipment and supplies
likely to be useful and useable to meet operational needs in most any
disaster response, and assessed what goods, foods, and medications
could be more or less readily integrated into federal disaster response
operations. This included consideration of, on the one hand, which
items posed minimal logistical constraints to entry into the United
States and were culturally appropriate for the disaster affected
population and, on the other hand, which items were subject to
current restrictions under national law or otherwise faced difficulties
for clearing the items for entry into the United States.4 5
The respective objectives of Articles 17 and 15 in facilitating
entry and conditioning assistance are at odds, if the affected state
does not consider both in a deliberate manner to inform a
comprehensive approach to how to facilitate entry of those goods and
services that are particularly of the quality and purpose to benefit
persons impacted by the disaster. Compared to most other ILC draft

42.
See, e.g., IAS CONOPS 2010, supra note 17, at 23-24 (listing agency roles
and responsibilities); see also IAS CONOPS 2009, supra note 18.
43.
LAS CONOPS 2015, supra note 18, at 9.
44.
See IAS CONOPS 2010, supra note 17, at 10-11, 14-17, 22-25 (detailing
agency roles and responsibilities and the regulation of food, personnel, and
transportation); see also IAS CONOPS 2015, supra note 18, at App. B-H (detailing
internal regulatory coordination references).
45.
See IAS CONOPS 2015, supra note 18, at 4, 26 (additionally conditioning
acceptance of external assistance offers on the assisting state's agreement that FEMA
could make any unused supplies available for future U.S. disaster response efforts.
While not specifically contemplated by the ILC draft articles, this serves to limit waste
or costs associated with return or disposal of goods that ultimately were not needed or
used for the specific disaster that the assisting state otherwise intended and reflects
Article 15 consideration of managing the scope of external assistance with respect to
the needs of the disaster).
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articles, the second paragraph of Article 17 more clearly anticipates
that a potentially affected state will, in advance of a disaster,
institute the necessary legal authorities to ensure flexibility during
the incident to facilitate external assistance. But, as the United
States' experience showed, even if the affected state has a legal
framework to guide both conditions on external assistance, as well as
flexibility in entry procedures, the state needs to plan ahead
specifically for the coordinated disaster application of those
authorities if it hopes to achieve the balance between expediency and,
in effect, operational control and quality control.

V. CONTINUING CHALLENGE: STRIKING THE BALANCE FOR RESPONSE
PERSONNEL
In most cases, the U.S. government was fortunate that its
existing national legal and regulatory framework-both in its
disaster legal authorities and general welfare provisions of other
laws- provided most of the necessary legal and regulatory tools for
the United States to ultimately apply them to the disaster assistance
context in the form of IAS CONOPS. This will ideally ensure a
smooth, "facilitated" entry of goods and personnel suitable to the
disaster impacts in the future-and consistent with the intent of the
current draft articles' mandates for affected states both to condition
and facilitate external assistance. For the critical asset of first
responders, however, existing U.S. legal authorities arguably do not
accommodate the need to address that tension between the interests
of facilitating assistance and of imposing conditions to maintain, in
particular, the "quality" of that assistance.
When a catastrophic disaster strikes, the first hours and days
are focused on life-saving efforts of those in the impact area. Timely,
unimpeded access to the site for urban search and rescue teams and
medical response personnel is essential to preserving as many lives
as possible; for example, when a no-notice incident in the United
States warrants federal urban search and rescue support, FEMIA
initially identifies and deploys the closest of twenty-eight domestic
task forces to report within twenty-four hours. 46 But, given the timesensitive and labor-intensive nature of deploying to, locating, and
extricating disaster survivors from extensive debris or earth, the
needs from catastrophic or simultaneous large-scale disasters
impacting the United States may exceed the capacity of the twentyeight search and rescue task forces that compose the National Urban
Search and Rescue System and other federal search and rescue

FEMA Directive 2014-018, US&R Program Directive: Event Resource
46.
Selection Process (FEMA Dec. 19, 2014).
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assets. As with other personnel, the United States can employ
existing flexibilities to expedite entry of international urban search
and rescue teams, as well as medical teams or other first response
personnel, as summarized in the IAS CONOPS. 47 The potential need
for FEMVA to access external assistance from other countries' first
response search and rescue and medical personnel in order to save
lives in the immediate aftermath of a catastrophic disaster is perhaps
the most direct illustration of how Article 17's focus on facilitating aid
serves the ILC draft articles' fundamental purpose of protecting
persons affected by disasters. Likewise, it is also a critical area in
which the affected state must exercise its responsibility carefully to
ensure the external assistance will be effective and competent in
meeting high-stake health and life-saving needs-that is, the affected
state must determine how to condition such assistance, pursuant to
Article 15, in consideration of the "need" and "quality" required.
Whereas the U.S. regulatory framework presents a system
within which the federal government has express prohibitions and
limitations in place to regulate food and drugs, the U.S. federalist
system of government complicates national level "quality control"
over individual professionals. The federal government generally has
no authority for professional licensing and registration. Individual
U.S. states license medical professionals for practice within that
state's jurisdiction and in accordance with that state's own medical
and professional standards. 48 In-state licensing requirements would
not permit a member of a foreign rescue or medical team to obtain an
in-state medical license in the hours or days necessary to allow for
timely support to a U.S. disaster response effort. To further
complicate easy access to medical and other first responders, the
exercise of medical or search and rescue services raises liability
concerns for the response personnel's actions while performing in the
United States.
In the domestic context, the U.S. emergency management legal
framework has addressed these issues by authorizing the U.S.
government to "federalize" members of certain first response teams in
support of federal disaster response operations: in the United States,

47.
See IAS CONOPS 2015, supra note 18, at 45-52 (establishing the
procedures for requesting and receiving urban search and rescue teams).
48.
UNITED STATES MEDICAL LICENSING EXAMINATION, http://www.usmle.org/
about/ [http://perma.cc/CQW5-P8MD] (archived Sept. 11, 2015); see FEDERATION OF
STATE MEDICAL BOARDS: DIRECTORY OF STATE MEDICAL & OSTEOPATHIC BOARDS,

http://www.fsmb.org/about-fsmb/directory-hub [http://perma.cc/ZAC5-P5HP] (archived
Sept. 11, 2015) (providing links to each U.S. state and territory medical licensure
MEDICAL TECHNICIANS:
requirements);
NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EMERGENCY
CERTIFICATION V. LICENSURE, https://www.nremt.org/nremtlabout/Legal-Opinion.asp
[https://perma.cc/SKC7-FFDE] (archived Sept. 11, 2015) (explaining that state
licensure also required for EMT practice in a state).
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urban search and rescue task forces are community-based, and when
needed to support a major disaster response, FEMA activates and
deploys one or more of the twenty-eight task forces it has preidentified as part of the National Urban Search and Rescue System. 49
The task forces in the System maintain certain standards and, once
activated for federal deployment, are under the direction of the
federal government and are generally expected to have the
protections from tort claims as federal employees.so With respect to
health and medical professionals, the National Response Framework,
through HHS, uses the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) as
a federally coordinated means to activate and deploy various types of
medical teams to provide supplemental federal response capability for
disasters.51 Similar to search and rescue assets, the U.S. government
through the NDMS can "federalize" and rapidly deploy pre-identified
Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT).6 2 When NDMS/DMAT
personnel licensed in a U.S. state are activated as intermittent
federal employees, their licensure and certification are recognized by
all states, and the Federal Tort Claims Act protects them from
liability in the event of a malpractice claim for actions they took in
the course of the federal medical response effort.53 These legal
mechanisms do not, however, extend to permit the U.S. government
to facilitate access to or address qualification standards of foreign
medical and other professionals in the same way. Nor do they address
liability considerations with respect to foreign response and medical
teams performing services in the United States.
In the case of urban search and rescue teams, there exists a wellestablished set of international guidelines specifying team technical
qualifications, deployment time capability, and a methodology for
international coordination: the guidelines of the International Search
and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG), established in 1991 within
the UN framework, provide clear, objective standards the U.S.

49.

NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION (ESF)

NO. 9-4: SEARCH AND RESCUE ANNEX (2013), http://www.fema.gov/media-librarydata/20130726-1914-25045-1746/finalesf_9_search-and rescue annex_201305 01.pdf
[http://perma.cc/T2AN-HEAK] (archived Sept. 11, 2015).
50.
44 C.F.R. § 208.11 (2009).
NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION NO. 851.
4: PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL SERVICES ANNEX (2013), http://www.fema.gov/media-

library-data/20130726-1914-25045-5673/finaLesf_8_public_health_
medical_20130501.pdf [http://perma.cc/BXJ4-HRSR (archived Sept. 11, 2015).
42 U.S.C. § 300hh-11(c) (2013).
52.
53.

See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS, PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY:

DISASTER MED. ASSISTANCE TEAM, http://www.phe.gov/preparedness/responders/ndms/
(archived Sept. 11, 2015)
teams/pages/dmat.aspx [http://perma.cc/93SK-JZB2]
(referencing the Federal Tort Claims Act, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)).
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government can accept. 54 Unfortunately, this does not solve our
liability and medical licensure issues. 5 5
After Hurricane Katrina, the IAS CONOPS acknowledged the
possibility of accepting INSARAG-certified urban search and rescue
teams, but in the absence of federal law to address liability and
medical licensing issues, the IAS CONOPS deferred to the individual
U.S. states impacted by a disaster and those states offering external
assistance to accept responsibility. 56 The IAS CONOPS provided that
before FEMA would accept foreign medical or response teams, the
impacted U.S. states would need to waive or address licensure issues,
and DOS would inform a state offering external assistance that the
U.S. government could not accept liability for harm to or caused by
the foreign response team members. 5
Liability. In 2011, FEMA and other federal agencies participated
in a National Level Exercise to test certain interagency and
intergovernmental responses for a catastrophic earthquake in the
New Madrid Seismic Zone scenario causing extensive damage across
eight states in the southern and midwestern U.S. states.5 8 During the
exercise, FEMA requested twenty-four international urban search
and rescue teams to supplement the twenty-eight domestic task
forces in the national system. Through the post-Katrina IAS
CONOPS process, the United States received and accepted offers for
teams from twelve EU member states and eleven other states.5 9
Pursuant to the IAS CONOPS, acceptance notifications explained the
U.S. condition that the assisting state would need to accept potential
tort liability. All but two assisting states rescinded their offers.6 0 In a
2014 exercise further developing the 2011 scenario, modeling
indicated that 715,000 buildings would be damaged in the eight-state
study region, and about 42,000 search and rescue personnel working

54.
See G.A. Res. 57/150, (Dec. 16, 2002) (urging states to take into account the
guidelines of INSARAG). The United States was one of 58 countries that sponsored the
UN resolution endorsing the INSARAG guidelines.
55.
See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN
AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL SEARCH AND RESCUE ADVISORY GROUP: GUIDELINES AND

METHODOLOGY
66
(2012),
http://www.insarag.org/images/stories/INSARAG.
Guidelines-2012_ENG-_Readversion.pdf [http://perma.cc/R47L-24VH] (archived Sept.
11, 2015) (explaining that teams only include a medical component to meet team needs
and, if approved by affected state, to treat entrapped victims).
See IAS CONOPS 2015, supra note 18, at 42, 46 (noting that in the absence
56.
of any specific provision for the United States or affected state to cover such liability,
the offering country or organization must acknowledge that the United States cannot
provide liability protection).
Id. at 15.
57.
58.

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, NATIONAL LEVEL EXERCISE

2011 AFTER-ACTION REPORT (Oct. 28, 2011).
59.
Id.
Id. at 43.
60.
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in 1,500 teams will be required to respond.6 1 Based on the 2011
exercise, the United States may not receive the external assistance
needed to meet the needs of those impacted by a catastrophic
disaster.
Medical qualifications. If the U.S. government sought medical
teams to support federal medical response capability, there is
currently no international standard or U.S. mechanism for the
federal government to accept qualifications for medical professionals.
In 2013, a Foreign Medical Team working group, established by the
World Health Organization in the aftermath of the significant
international medical response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake,
completed a draft document setting out minimum standards and
classification criteria for foreign medical teams. 62 Similar in some
respects to the INSARAG guidelines, once finalized, this tool may
serve to provide a reference for the U.S. government in assessing
capability and quality of foreign medical response teams, but it is
unclear to what extent it could satisfy U.S. medical licensure and
credentialing concerns. In the meantime, while some U.S. state laws
provide authority for waiver of their licensing and credentialing
requirements in certain emergency circumstances, 63 it is uncertain
what considerations the states would have in issuing a waiver
permitting foreign medical practitioners to practice in that state, or if
they are procedurally prepared to implement a waiver during a
disaster without delay.
While the United States could likely manage some patchwork of
state waivers and mechanisms for coordination to facilitate the entry
of foreign medical teams to support the medical needs of persons
impacted by a catastrophic disaster in the United States, domestic
state and federal legal authorities do not currently provide a means
for the United States both to facilitate acceptance (e.g., through statelicensing waivers) while also maintaining national level coordination
and quality control, for example, through the NDMS. Since this
federal medical response capability is typically activated when the
disaster response exceeds state and local capacity, impacted U.S.

61.
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UNITED
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EARTHQUAKE

CONSORTIUM,
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AFTER-ACTION REPORT 15 (July 2014) (citing the model based on MID-AMERICA
EARTHQUAKE CENTER, REPORT 09-03: IMPACT OF EARTHQUAKES ON THE CENTRAL USA

Vol. 1 (October 2009)).
62.
MINIMUM

IAN NORTON ET AL., TECHNICAL CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION AND
http://
(Mar. 2013),
FOREIGN MEDICAL TEAMS
FOR
STANDARDS

www.apednn.org/uploads/ForeignMedTeamsMinimumStandard.pdf
YB-EVKQ] (archived Sept. 11, 2015).

[http://perma.cc/5G

63.
ASSOCIATION OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFICIALS, VOLUNTEER
LICENSING, CREDENTIALING, AND PRIVILEGING AND WAIVER AND RECIPROCITY FACT

SHEET (2015), http://www.astho.org/Programs/Preparedness/Public-Health-EmergencyLaw/Emergency-Volunteer-Toolkit/Volunteer-Licensing-Credentialing-and-Privilegingand-Waiver-and-Reciprocity/ [http://perma.cc/5TC8-Q4X6] (archived Sept. 11, 2015).
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states would presumably not be prepared to take on the coordination
of foreign medical teams when, in fact, the U.S. government requests
foreign teams for a catastrophic disaster that overwhelms its federal
response capability. In short, to be prepared to respond effectively to
a catastrophic disaster, an affected state needs to identify in steady
state-before the need arises-processes to address licensing,
credentialing, and verification for timely entry of medical and other
professionals during the critical early response phase of a disaster.
In this instance, the U.S. legal framework could be improved to
ensure that the United States can meet the objectives of ILC draft
Articles 15 and 17 in steady state, by instituting clear authority and
mechanisms for the federal government to verify and accept
qualifications of foreign medical professionals (and other technical
specialists), and to facilitate the entry of foreign medical teams and
professionals deemed qualified, with privileges and immunities as
may be appropriate to protect such personnel from suit for actions
they take to protect lives under the direction of the U.S. government.
The enactment and advance planning for using such legal authority
could assure orderly, coordinated U.S. access to competent, external
medical assistance should U.S. first responder resources ever prove
insufficient to meet the needs of individuals impacted by a
catastrophic disaster in the United States.

VI. CONCLUSION
As the U.S. experience in the aftermath of Katrina showed, even
the U.S. government, which historically was well practiced in
coordinating domestic disaster response operations, struggled to
manage external assistance without established, advance protocols
and targeted legal authorities in place that specifically contemplated
receiving international disaster assistance. The ILC draft articles set
forth a brief but comprehensive framework of fundamental principles
for states to cooperate in disaster response efforts and can serve as a
flexible roadmap for states to consider in strengthening various
aspects of their law and practices to fit their unique emergency
management legal frameworks and disaster response challenges.
States should not underestimate the importance of proactively and
deliberately anticipating and addressing at a practical level the legal
and operational challenges to international support for a domestic
event. Lessons learned and model tools, such as those developed by
the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies, can further assist this effort. 64 To be prepared to effectively

64.
See, e.g., International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent,
Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation of international disaster relief

940

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 48:921

manage external assistance to meet the needs of individuals impacted
by a catastrophic disaster, a government must examine its own legal
and institutional circumstances and address these issues when in
steady state-before it is an "affected state"-through advance
development and application of national legal authorities in the
specific context of disaster response, as well as related operational
procedures.

and initial recovery assistance (IDRL Guidelines), http://www.ifrc.orglen/what-we-do/
idrl/idrl-guidelines/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2015) [http://perma.cc/3BRL-H69S] (archived
Sept. 11, 2015) (explaining IDLR guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation
of international disaster relief and initial recovery assistance and adopted by the state
parties to the Geneva Conventions in Nov. 30, 2007).

